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SEARCH AND SEIZURE: THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT-A
FURTHER EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH: State v. Capps'
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of search and seizure is one of the more complex areas of
criminal procedure, particularly with respect to the judicially created
exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. 2 One exception
to the warrant requirement is known as the Carroll Doctrine3 or auto-
mobile exception. The automobile exception allows certain warrantless
automobile searches,' but has been limited for years by its specific re-
quirements of probable cause and exigent circumstances. 5 These limits
have allowed law enforcement officials to make warrantless searches of
cars when necessary6 and, at the same time, have protected citizens'
legitimate privacy interests in the contents of their automobiles. 7
Recently, however, courts addressing warrantless automobile searches
have placed less emphasis on citizens' interests in privacy and have
provided law enforcement officials with additional power to search with-
out a warrant. This change in the law of automobile searches is the result
of State v. Capps,8 a New Mexico Supreme Court case which, in effect,
extended New Mexico search and seizure law for automobiles. Soon after
Capps was decided, the United States Supreme Court issued a similar
opinion in United States v. Ross.9
1. 97 N.M. 453, 641 P.2d 484 (1982).
2. The following are six exceptions to the warrant requirement: search incident to arrest, Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); plain view,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); consent, Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); and automobile exception, Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
3. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
4. Capps, 97 N.M. at 455, 641 P.2d at 486.
5. Id. at 455, 641 P.2d at 486. Exigent circumstances are those which require immediate action
because, for example, the automobile is mobile and may be driven away and the contraband may
be lost before police obtain a warrant. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
In Carroll, the Court noted that "vehicles can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought," and such mobility necessitates some warrantless automobile
searches. Id.
6. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless automobile search upheld
on the basis of probable cause and mobility).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (warrantless search of a footlocker
in an automobile trunk ruled unconstitutional on the basis of expectations of privacy and lack of
exigency).
8. 97 N.M. 453, 641 P.2d 484.
9. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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This Note explores the law of automobile searches prior to Capps and
Ross and reviews the elements previously necessary for warrantless au-
tomobile searches pursuant to the automobile exception. The Note also
examines the holdings and rationale in Capps and Ross and comments
on the direction the courts now appear to be taking in this area. This
direction seems to broaden the automobile exception to the warrant re-
quirement by giving law enforcement officials more latitude in warrantless
searches. As a result of this new direction, more warrantless automobile
and container searches will be found constitutional at the cost of fourth
amendment privacy rights against unreasonable or warrantless searches.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 13, 1979, a plainclothes Artesia narcotics officer validly
stopped a car occupied by James Lear and Richard Capps. 0 As Lear, the
driver, looked in the glove compartment for the car registration, sixteen-
year veteran Officer Jerry Privitts stuck his head in the car and smelled
raw marijuana and talcum powder. " He asked Lear what was in the trunk
and Lear replied, "Nothing."'I2 When the officer asked him to open the
trunk, Lear attempted to bribe Privitts. 3 The officer refused the bribe and
ordered Lear to open the trunk and both men to keep their hands where
he could see them. The officer later testified that at this time he considered
both Lear and Capps under his arrest and control.' 4
Inside the trunk were nine large dark garbage bags, triple-bagged and
triple-sealed. 5 Each bag top was rolled shut and sealed with silver tape. 6
The officer later testified that garbage bags commonly were used to pack-
age marijuana, 17 but he also admitted that such bags often were used to
carry a variety of personal items.' 8 At the scene, the officer tore open
one of the triple-sealed bags and found what was later determined to be
marijuana. "
10. The validity of the stop was not at issue at the New Mexico Supreme Court; it was decided
on an interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals. The court of appeals held that the stop was valid
because a police teletype describing a suspect's car similar to the one in which Capps was a passenger
constituted reasonable suspicion. State v. Capps, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 399, 400. (Ct. App. April
9, 1981).
11. The officer later testified that talcum powder commonly was used to mask the odor of
marijuana. 97 N.M. at 454, 641 P.2d at 485.
12. Id. at 459, 641 P.2d at 490 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
13. "Look, officer, can't we make a deal? If you'll just forget this whole thing, I'll make it worth
your while." Id. at 454, 641 P.2d at 485.
14. Id. at 459, 641 P.2d at 490 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
15. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 401.
16. 97 N.M. at 454, 641 P.2d at 485.
17. Id. at 461, 641 P.2d at 493 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
18. Respondent's Brief at 8, State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 641 P.2d 484 (1982).
19. The nine bags contained between 84 pounds and 88 pounds of marijuana. 20 N.M. St. B.
Bull. at 401; 97 N.M. at 454 n.2, 641 P.2d at 485 n.2.
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Capps was tried and convicted of possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute.2" On appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, Capps
claimed that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress
the marijuana evidence and effectively dismissed the case.2 Capps argued
that a lack of exigent circumstances for the car and the bags,22 coupled
with a high expectation of privacy in both, made the warrantless search
illegal.23 The State argued that Officer Privitts had the necessary probable
cause and that Capps had sufficiently low expectations of privacy in the
car and its contents to justify a warrantless search. In the alternative, the
State argued that the warrantless search fell under the search incident to
arrest exception.24
The court of appeals reversed the conviction and held that Capps'
motion to suppress should have been granted at trial. The court reasoned
that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the
bags, no exigent circumstances existed, and consequently a warrant was
required.25
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
upheld the search on the grounds that opening the bags was a valid exercise
of police power under the automobile exception to the warrant require-
ment. The court found that probable cause and sufficient exigent circum-
stances existed for the Capps search and that, as a result, the elements
of the automobile exception were present. Therefore, the court ruled that
the officer had not violated Capps' fourth amendment rights.26
1II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement in Automobiles
The opinions in the area of automobile searches are difficult to deci-
pher. 27 Frequently, courts have been unable to distinguish two exceptions
to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement2" in automobile cases: the
"search incident to arrest" exception29 and the "automobile exception"
20. Capps, 97 N.M. at 454, 641 P.2d at 485. Capps was charged under N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-
31-22(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
21. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 400.
22. Respondent's Brief at 14-15, State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 641 P.2d 484 (1982).
23. Id. at 26.
24. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 400-01.
25. Id. at 401.
26. 97 N.M. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489.
27. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring): "[1"he
law of search and seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing. See also Note,
The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 251 (1981).
28. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause .... U.S. Const. amend. IV.
29. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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or Carroll Doctrine.30 Under the search incident to arrest exception, police
may conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee and the area within the
arrestee's immediate control.3 Under the automobile exception impend-
ing arrest is irrelevant, but police may search an automobile without a
warrant if they find both probable cause and exigent circumstances.32
These two exceptions often are confused and "intertwined in one ana-
lytically inextricable mess." 33 A brief historical analysis of the manner
in which the two exceptions were interpreted prior to Capps will illuminate
the constitutional powers once possessed by police to search automobiles
without warrants, and will contrast the reasoning and holding of prior
automobile search cases with the result of the Capps decision.
1. Search Incident to Arrest
For years, Chimel v. California34 remained the leading case on searches
incident to arrest. According to Chimel, an officer could conduct a search
of "the area within the immediate control of the arrestee." 35 Recently,
the United States Supreme Court announced an expanded brightline rule
for search incident to arrest cases involving automobiles. In New York v.
Belton,36 the Court ruled that "when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contem-
poraneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of
that automobile." 37 The Court reaffirmed Chimel's definition of the area
within the immediate control of the arrestee,3 8 and significantly extended
the definition to include a search of any open or closed container within
the arrestee's immediate control.39 In other words, Belton approved searches
of containers within the passenger compartment of automobiles, regard-
less of whether the arrestee was near the automobile.a° Therefore, pursuant
to Chimel and Belton, the search incident to arrest doctrine permits a
search of the interior of the passenger compartment of an automobile and
of any container found there. This doctrine reflects only the limits of the
warrantless search of an arrestee and the area "surrounding" him. The
30. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
31. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
32. Capps, 97 N.M. at 455, 641 P.2d at 486.
33. Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search
of a Clearer Label, 27 Mercer L. Rev. 987, 1013 (1976).
34. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
35. Id. at 763.
36. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
37. Id. at 460.
38. 395 U.S. at 763.
39. 453 U.S. at 460-61.
40. Id. at 462-63. In Belton the Court was upholding a search of a jacket in the back seat of the
automobile after the defendant had been removed from the car. Id. at 456. For a criticism of this
approach to searches incident to arrest, see Note, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
17, 261 (1981).
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police powers and limits pursuant to a search incident to arrest are entirely
different from those pursuant to an automobile exception search.
2. Automobile Exception/Carroll Doctrine
The "automobile exception" stems from the 1925 Carroll decision.41
In Carroll, federal prohibition agents unexpectedly encountered an au-
tomobile which they believed was being used to carry contraband liquor.
They stopped the car on the highway, searched the entire car without a
warrant, slashed open the car's upholstery and found sixty-eight bottles
of gin and whiskey inside the seat cushions.42 The Supreme Court upheld
the warrantless search of the automobile because it was impractical for
agents to secure a warrant before searching a mobile vehicle. 3 Therefore,
because officers had probable cause to believe contraband was being
transported in a mobile vehicle, the Carroll Court allowed a warrantless
search of the car.
The Carroll automobile exception has been the basis for many war-
rantless automobile search cases since 1925. For example, in a recent
plurality opinion in Robbins v. California,' a companion case to Belton,
the Court reiterated that "a search warrant is unnecessary 'where there
is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the
car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may
never be found again if a warrant must be obtained."' 45 Probable cause
and mobility are the original Carroll requirements and, as in Robbins,
are the often repeated justifications for the automobile exception.
Additionally, the Court has upheld warrantless searches of automobiles
even when mobility was not an issue.' The basis for the extension of
the exception was that one has a lesser expectation of privacy in an
automobile than, for example, in a home. 4" Therefore, under Carroll and
41. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
42. Id. at 136.
43. Id. at 153.
44. 453 U.S. 420 (plurality opinion).
45. Id. at 424 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970)).
46. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 424. The non-mobility cases stem from reasons set forth in South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), and Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), regarding
the necessity of conducting warrantless routine inventory searches of automobiles at police stations.
47. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 424. The Court stated:
The automobile exception . . . is thus also supported by 'the diminished expec-
tation of privacy which surrounds the automobile and which arises from the facts
that a car is used for transportation and not as a residence or a repository of
personal effects, that a car's occupants and contents travel in plain view, and that
automobiles are necessarily highly regulated by government.' (citation omitted).
Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977)). See also Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 595 (1974), where a warrantless automobile search at a police station was upheld.
Although the suspect was in the police station and the vehicle was not mobile, the Court determined
that the search was allowable because vehicles, especially the tires and outside of those parked in
public lots, have a low expectation of privacy connected with them. Id. at 590-91.
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later cases, law enforcement officials were authorized to conduct war-
rantless automobile searches on the basis of (1) probable cause and (2)
mobility or lower expectations of privacy.
In Robbins, the Court again rejected the suggestion that the two-part
automobile exception, unlike a search incident to arrest, justified the
warrantless search of a closed container found inside an automobile. 8 In
Robbins, police had probable cause to search the automobile, but they
also searched several wrapped and sealed containers found in a recessed
luggage compartment 9.4  The Court emphasized that, even with probable
cause, a search of luggage within an automobile is not proper, either
under the exigent circumstances theory5" or under the theory of a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in automobiles.' Luggage is not inherently
mobile and may be seized and kept under the control of the police until
they obtain a warrant. 2 The Court also reasoned that there is a strong
expectation of privacy in luggage within a car trunk. 3 Based upon this
analysis, the Robbins Court held that a closed opaque bag containing
marijuana bricks could not be opened without a constitutionally mandated
warrant.
B. Automobile Searches in New Mexico
For years, New Mexico courts have permitted warrantless searches of
automobiles if there was evidence of probable cause55 and exigent cir-
cumstances of mobility56 or reduced expectations of privacy."7 In addition,
New Mexico has followed the federal fourth amendment standard that
the automobile exception does not automatically justify a warrantless
search of seizable containers.58 In State v. Luna,59 for example, the New
48. 453 U.S. at 428-29.
49. Id. at 422. This type of case has been called a "non-container" case because police had
probable cause to believe contraband was somewhere in the car. Police in Robbins were not on the
lookout for specific containers, as in "container" cases such as Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753(1979) (a suitcase), and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (a footlocker). For a discussion
of this distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 95-103.
50. 453 U.S. at 424.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 425.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 428.
55. State v. Lucero, 70 N.M. 268, 275, 372 P.2d 837, 842 (1962).
56. State v. Aull, 78 N.M. 607, 612, 435 P.2d 437, 442, cert. denied, 391 U.S. 927 (1967).
57. State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 502, 612 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1980). But see State v. Sandoval,
92 N.M. 476, 478, 590 P.2d 175, 177 (1978): "Exigent circumstances are not required for the
search of an automobile stopped on a public highway where there is probable cause for the search."
For an excellent outline of New Mexico law in this area, see M. Hermann, L. Stelzner and T.
Heisey, Search and Seizure: Outlines of Federal and New Mexico Law, 49-59 (1982).
58. See, e.g., State v. Kaiser, 91 N.M. 611, 577 P.2d 1257 (1978) (warrantless search of closed
luggage in a train compartment held invalid under Chadwick privacy expectation).
59. 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980).
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Mexico Supreme Court held unlawful two warrantless searches of an
automobile and the containers within the automobile. Luna was arrested
for illegal alcohol consumption and was detained at the police station for
several days. During his detention, the police made two warrantless searches
of Luna's car at the station for purposes unrelated to circumstances at
the scene of the arrest." The supreme court ruled in favor of Luna, stating
about the first warrantless search:
While there may have been probable cause to search the car at the
station, there were no exigent circumstances. It is clear that probable
cause alone is not enough, in most circumstances, for a valid search.
Probable cause must be coupled with a warrant or exigent circum-
stances in order to justify a search. 6'
The court followed federal precedent 62 on this issue and reaffirmed the
necessity of finding both probable cause and exigent circumstances for
warrantless automobile searches in New Mexico.
The most recent New Mexico automobile search case prior to Capps,
State v. White,63 addressed the warrantless search of sealed cardboard
boxes and closed bags in an automobile trunk. The court of appeals held
the search unconstitutional, basing its decision in part on the character-
istics of the containers. The court reasoned that the containers supported
a reasonable expectation of privacy because the closed and taped boxes
and bags did not clearly announce their contents.' The court found that
the reasonable expectation of privacy made the search of the boxes un-
constitutional. 65
New Mexico courts are bound to follow the holdings of the United
States Supreme Court on the fourth amendment issue of automobile
searches.' Decisions such as White and Luna illustrate adherence to
Supreme Court automobile exception analyses. This adherence to the fine
points of the automobile exception changed, however, in State v. Capps.
The Capps dissent stated: "The majority opinion is a blatant violation of
our own mandate and overrules [United States Supreme Court cases]...
sub silentio. " 67 Nevertheless, the majority found reasons to justify its
60. Id. at 776-77, 606 P.2d at 187-88. The police arrested Luna for alcohol violations, but later,
at the station, searched his car for items connected with a theft and a murder. Id.
61. Id. at 778, 606 P.2d at 188.
62. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
63. 94 N.M. 687, 615 P.2d 1004 (Ct. App. 1980).
64. Id. at 689, 615 P.2d at 1006. The court held that the strong odor of marijuana provided the
necessary probable cause to search the trunk, but there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the containers. Id. at 688, 615 P.2d at 1005. No exigent circumstances were claimed for the boxes.
Id.
65. Id. at 689, 615 P.2d at 1006.
66. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Bourguet v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
Co., 65 N.M. 207, 334 P.2d 1112 (1959).
67. 97 N.M. at 458-59, 641 P.2d at 489-90 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
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determination that the Capps search was lawful, without expressly con-
tradicting federal and state precedent.
C. The Capps Decision
1. Introduction
The issue before the New Mexico Supreme Court in Capps was
twofold. The court addressed first "whether the police officer pursuant
to the 'automobile exception' could search the trunk of a car,"' 68 and
second, whether he could "open the plastic bags located in the trunk."69
The court considered whether the automobile exception applied in this
case to the search of the trunk and of the bags. The court determined that
the exception applied in both areas and that the officer could conduct a
constitutionally valid warrantless search of every area of the automobile
and of every object that might contain the suspected contraband. 70
The Capps court initially recognized the two standard exceptions to
the warrant requirements for automobiles, search incident to arrest 7' and
the automobile exception, 72 and discussed the search in light of both
exceptions. The search incident to arrest discussion was not entirely
applicable in Capps. Indeed, after analysis of the search incident to arrest
doctrine, the court based its determination on the automobile exception. 73
The court did not answer directly whether the search incident to arrest
theory was controlling, but it did hold that the automobile exception was
a basis for allowing the warrantless search in this case. 74
2. Search Incident to Arrest
The court first began its analysis with an historical delineation of the
search incident to arrest exception. The court cited Belton for the prop-
osition that an officer may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle,
as well as any containers found within the compartment. 75 Indeed, Belton
does allow an officer the authority to search the interior of a passenger
vehicle without a warrant, if he is making an arrest.76 In Capps, however,
the bags were not in the passenger compartment or otherwise within reach
of the arrestees; rather, they were in the trunk. The warrantless search of
the trunk and the bags was not proper under the existing search incident
68. Id. at 454, 641 P.2d at 485.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489.
71. Id. at 454, 641 P.2d at 485.
72. Id. at 455, 641 P.2d at 486.
73. Id. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 455, 641 P.2d at 486; Belton, 453 U.S. at 462-63.
76. 453 U.S. at 460.
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to arrest exception.77 The supreme court did not find that the Capps
decision turned on the search incident to arrest theory, although this theory
was discussed in detail.78
3. Automobile Exception
The Capps court first discussed the automobile exception by referring
to the Carroll Doctrine and the need for probable cause and exigent
circumstances.79 The court noted that the odor of raw marijuana in Capps
was an adequate basis for finding probable cause;80 the officer strongly
suspected that marijuana was hidden somewhere in the car, although he
did not know in which containers.8 ' Based on these facts, the court
determined that Officer Privitts had probable cause to search both the
trunk and the bags.82 The court's analysis of the necessary exigent cir-
cumstances, however, was less clear than its probable cause determina-
tion. In order to find that the Capps search was constitutional according
to United States Supreme Court precedent, the Capps court had to find
the existence of exigent circumstances, such as (1) inherent mobility and
potential loss of evidence or (2) lower expectations of privacy for the
trunk and the bags. The court decided that exigent circumstances existed
and ruled the searches constitutional.
a. Search of the Trunk
In analyzing the search of the trunk, the court first found the existence
of the necessary exigent circumstances. 83 Citing United States v. Milhol-
Ian,84 the court included the following rationale within its definition of
exigent circumstances: "'the justification for the search must arise sud-
denly and unexpectedly."' 85 In Milhollan, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals permitted the exigent circumstances requirement to be satisfied
by an unexpected discovery of probable cause.8 6 The United States Su-
preme Court, however, had never used such a distinction as a basis for
exigent circumstances. Before Capps, Milhollan apparently was unique
in its determination that exigent circumstances are present, and thus war-
77. The State used the search incident to arrest rationale as an alternative theory, but the court
of appeals discounted the claim. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 399, 401 (Ct. App. April 9, 1981).
78. 97 N.M. at 454-55, 641 P.2d at 485-86.
79. Id. at 455, 641 P.2d at 486.
80. Id. at 456, 641 P.2d at 487.
81. Id. at 457, 641 P.2d at 488.
82. Id. at 456, 641 P.2d at 487.
83. Id.
84. 599 F.2d 518 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 909 (1979).
85. Capps, 97 N.M. at 456, 641 P.2d at 487 (quoting United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518,
526 (1979)).
86. 599 F.2d at 526.
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rantless automobile searches are justified, by mere sudden discovery of
probable cause.
The Capps court similarly held that the unexpected discovery of mar-
ijuana odor and the fact that the automobile was mobile were sufficient
exigent circumstances.87 Similar to Milhollan, the Capps court upheld
the officer's search of "the entire car," including the trunk.8" According
to other cases addressing the exigent circumstances of automobile searches,
however, it is largely irrelevant that Officer Privitts smelled marijuana
unexpectedly, absent a true exigent circumstance such as mobility.89 In
fact, mobility did not exist in Capps. Before Officer Privitts opened the
trunk, he considered both Lear and Capps under arrest. 9° He had ordered
them to keep their hands where he could see them. 9' The car was not
"mobile" if its occupants. were no longer free to leave. At the moment
of the search, the car was in the control of the Artesia Police Department. 92
Probable cause to search the trunk may have been present in Capps.
Under the facts discussed above, however, there appears to have been
no exigent factors. As a result, the automobile exception does not seem
applicable to the Capps situation. The officer was required by the fourth
amendment to obtain a warrant before searching the trunk of the seized
automobile. According to the case law discussed above, the inquiry should
not have proceeded further than the unlawful search of the trunk.
b. Search of the Bags
The Capps court relied heavily on United States v. Milhollan93 for its
decision on the issue of container searches. 94 In Milhollan, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals allowed a warrantless search of an arrestee's
unlocked satchel found on the back seat of his automobile. 95 The court
of appeals held that Milhollan was not a "container case," and that
Chambers v. Maroney,96 not United States v. Chadwick97 or Arkansas v.
Sanders,98 applied to the case. 9 Chambers held that guns found in a
87. 97 N.M. at 456, 641 P.2d at 487.
88. Id. (emphasis in original).
89. But see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). In Chambers and several subsequent
cases, the Court did not find that the presence of exigent circumstances actually was a controlling
factor. In Chambers, a warrantless automobile search at a police station was upheld because the
exigent circumstances at the scene were later "applied" to the automobile at the station. Id. at 52.
90. Id. at 459, 641 P.2d at 490 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Respondent's Brief at 9, State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 641 P.2d 484 (1982).
93. 599 F.2d at 518.
94. 97 N.M. at 456, 641 P.2d at 487.
95. 599 F.2d at 527.
96. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
97. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
98. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
99. 599 F.2d at 526-27.
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warrantless automobile search at the police station were admissible be-
cause probable cause and exigent circumstances allowing a search before
the arrest also were present later at the station.'0 Chadwick and Sanders,
however, held that warrantless searches of a footlocker and a suitcase
were illegal because police were not looking for anything except those
containers; the officers should not have searched within the containers. 10,
The Milhollan court reasoned that the officer there was looking for con-
traband somewhere in the car, rather than for particular containers. 102
Therefore, the officer was allowed to make a warrantless search of con-
tainers found anywhere in the automobile.'°3 The Capps court adopted
the Milhollan rationale, held that Milhollan and Chambers applied, and
distinguished the "container cases," Chadwick and Sanders."0
The Capps court also made a further, and relatively unique, distinction
of the container cases. The court distinguished Chadwick and Sanders
because the officers in those cases actually had seized the containers and
could have obtained warrants prior to searching inside the containers.105
In Capps, the court found there was no seizure of the automobile and
the containers.106 The police officer searched for contraband before the
automobile was seized and while the bags were still in the trunk. There-
fore, the Chadwick-Sanders analysis was not applicable;0 7 the bags ap-
parently were searchable because the officer "never seized the plastic
bags." 0 8 Based on this "container/non-container case" rationale, it now
seems that if an officer takes bags out of a car, he may not search the
bags without a warrant; however, if he leaves the bags in the trunk, he
may rummage through them. " The Capps dissent labeled this distinction
mere "sophistry."'10
Similarly, the Capps majority briefly dismissed Robbins as a container
case because the officer in Robbins "must have been considered to have
seized the bricks of marijuana.""' In Robbins, police officers found
several packages wrapped in green opaque plastic in a recessed luggage
100. 399 U.S. at 52.
101. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15; Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766.
102. 599 F.2d at 527.
103. Id. at 518.
104. 97 N.M. at 457, 641 P.2d at 488. The court stated: "[Tihe officer is allowed to search items
or containers located in the car to find the contraband as long as a specific container is not a particular
target." Id.
105. Id. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489.
106. Id. The bags, however, were seizable. They could have been taken out of the trunk and
transported to police headquarters to be searched with a warrant. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753, 766 (1979).
107. Id. at 457, 641 P.2d at 488.
108. Id. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489.
109. Id. at 462, 641 P.2d at 493 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
I 11. Id. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489.
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compartment of an automobile." 2 The warrantless search of the car was
upheld, but the warrantless search of the closed opaque containers was
held unconstitutional. 3 The Capps dissent argued that "Robbins, in par-
ticular, is indistinguishable from the case at bar and unquestionably sup-
ports a holding that the evidence herein should be suppressed." "14 According
to the dissent, however, "the majority purposely ignore[d] the clear man-
date of the United States Supreme Court . . .""' and "opt[ed] toward
citing a single federal court decision, Milhollan, which was decided three
months before Arkansas [v. Sanders] and which is not on point. .. 116
The Capps majority used a three-step rationale to defend the warrantless
search of the bags."' First, the court stated, a search with a warrant
enables an officer to search everything which might contain the objects
sought."' Second, a lawful search without a warrant, under the auto-
mobile exception, for example, would have the same scope as a search
with a warrant."' Therefore, the court concluded that a search under a
warrant exception allows a search of everything within the vehicle.
A problem arises in the second step of the court's analysis in that it
assumes that Capps was a lawful search covered by the automobile ex-
ception. As previously discussed, this assumption is not supported by
then-existing law because there were no exigent circumstances surround-
ing the trunk. Moreover, even if exigent circumstances existed and the
Capps trunk search was covered by the automobile exception, the au-
tomobile exception explicitly did not include closed containers. 20 As the
dissent noted, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly had rejected
this interpretation. 2' Therefore, even if a search warrant allowed a search
of everything within an automobile, a warrantless search under the au-
tomobile exception would not automatically include a search of every
item within the vehicle. A warrant was required for seizable containers. 12
The automobile exception, as mandated by the United States Supreme
Court, required probable cause and exigent circumstances.' 23 Probable
112. 453 U.S. at 422.
113. Id. at 428-29.
114. 97 N.M. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489 (Sosa, J., dissenting). The Capps court did not follow the
Robbins precedent. The court, however, had an "incentive" to sidestep the Robbins rule. At the
time Capps was decided, the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari in United States
v. Ross, and had asked the parties to address the question of whether the Court should reconsider
Robbins. Id. at 458 n.6, 641 P.2d at 489 n.6.
115. Id. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 460, 641 P.2d at 491 (Sosa, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 458, 641 P.2d at 489.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Robbins, 453 U.S. 420, 424.
121. Capps, 97 N.M. at 460, 641 P.2d at 491 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (warrant required for the search
of closed opaque bags in a recessed luggage area).
123. Capps, 97 N.M. at 456, 641 P.2d at 486.
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cause may have been sufficient grounds to procure a warrant, but, without
more, it was not enough to invoke the automobile exception. 12 4 Containers
should not have been searched absent exigent circumstances. '25 In Capps,
the officer had probable cause to search the bags, but there were no
exigent circumstances. In fact, no exigent circumstances were claimed
by the State.'26 The bags were not mobile, either in the stranded car or
otherwise; the arrestees were not able to quickly destroy eighty-eight
pounds of marijuana; the bags could have been seized unopened by the
police to be searched pursuant to a magistrate's warrant; and there was
a clear expectation of privacy in dark triple-wrapped and triple-sealed
bags locked in an automobile trunk.'27 Without exigent circumstances,
the automobile exception apparently was not applicable to the bags, and
the fourth amendment required a warrant for the search. 12
8
D. The Ross Decision
Four months after the New Mexico Supreme Court decided State v.
Capps, the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision in another
warrantless automobile search case, United States v. Ross. 29 The Ross
facts, holding, and rationale were strikingly similar to those in Capps.
In Ross, a previously reliable informant telephoned a District of Columbia
detective with information about a recently completed drug deal. An
individual called "Bandit" allegedly was selling narcotics out of his
parked car. The informant described the individual and the automobile
to the police. Officers found and stopped the described vehicle, ordered
Ross out of the car, and searched Ross and the passenger compartment
of the car. The officers found a bullet on the front seat and a pistol in
the glove compartment. After Ross was arrested and handcuffed, the
officers searched the trunk and discovered a closed brown paper bag and
a zippered leather pouch. An officer immediately searched the bag, which
contained small clear bags of what was later determined to be heroin.
The pouch contained a large amount of cash. 3°
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Robbins, 453 U.S. 420, 425 (1981) (lack of mobility and a low expectation of
privacy necessitated obtaining a warrant).
126. 97 N.M. at 462, 641 P.2d at 493 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
127. The majority did not discuss the defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy. The dissent,
however, insisted that the defendant had a strong factual basis to support a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Id. at 461, 641 P.2d at 492 (Sosa, J., dissenting). In addition, the court of appeals stated:
"[T1o say there can be no expectation of privacy [in these bags] . . . is to ignore the obvious." 20
N.M. St. B. Bull. at 401.
128. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,428-29 (1981) (warrant required for container
searches pursuant to the automobile exception).
129. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
130. The pouch contained $3,200 in cash. Id. at 801. For a detailed discussion of the facts, see
id. at 800-01.
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Ross was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute. 3 '
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the warrantless search
of the trunk, but ruled that the propriety of the search of the containers
was to be determined based on reasonable expectations of privacy.'32
Therefore, the court allowed the search of the brown paper bag, but not
of the zippered leather pouch. 13 3 In a rehearing en banc, the court of
appeals reversed the decision and found both container searches uncon-
stitutional. The court held that "the Fourth Amendment warrant require-
ment forbids the warrantless opening of a closed, opaque paper bag to
the same extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a small unlocked
suitcase or a zippered leather pouch. "134 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, however, and upheld the searches and the conviction. 131
The Court's decision was based on the scope of lawful searches under
the Carroll Doctrine. 136 The Court defined the scope of warrantless searches
by the object of the search. The Court examined Carroll, Chadwick,
Sanders, and Robbins, and distinguished Chadwick and Sanders. 1 7 In
Chadwick and Sanders, police officers were looking for particular con-
tainers, a footlocker and a green suitcase, respectively. Once these con-
tainers were found, the Court determined, the lawful warrantless searches
should have ended. The scope of the warrantless searches did not extend
to looking within the containers.' 38 In Ross, however, the officers were
looking for contraband somewhere in the car. 'I Therefore, the Ross
majority ruled it was lawful to search all the containers without a war-
rant. '" The Ross analysis is very similar to that used by the majority in
Capps. 141
The Ross Court held that the scope of a warrantless search of an
automobile is not defined by the nature of the container which holds the
contraband. 42 The Court stated, "Rather, it is defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that
it may be found."' 43 Therefore, as long as an officer has probable cause
to believe there is contraband in a car or in containers within the car, he
131. 456 U.S. at 801. Ross was found in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a).
132. 456 U.S. at 802.
133. Id.
134. 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
135. 456 U.S. at 825.
136. Id. at 817.
137. Id. at 810-14.
138. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
766 (1979).
139. 456 U.S. at 800-01.
140. Id. at 825.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 95-103.
142. 456 U.S. at 824.
143. Id.
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may conduct a warrantless search of any places or objects that may contain
the contraband. With the Ross decision, the Court overruled Robbins, '44
and held that the scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause
is equal to the scope of a warrant-authorized search. 145 The Court added,
"Only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived,"'" and police
determination of probable cause "justifies the search of every part of the
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search."' 47
The Ross majority reaffirmed that searches without prior judicial ap-
proval are per se unreasonable, but insisted that the search fit within the
category of "specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."1
48
The automobile exception, however, as it was known in prior cases,
actually was not present as a well-delineated exception in Ross. Mobility,
or lack thereof, apparently was not a factor; the District of Columbia
detectives had arrested the defendant and had his automobile under their
control. 149 Nor was a lower expectation of privacy in the car or containers
a factor. The trunk was locked and the ordinary-looking containers were
closed. 5 ° In fact, no exigent circumstances existed for the containers.
Therefore, a warrant appeared to have been mandated by the Court's
prior interpretations of the fourth amendment in automobile cases. In
Ross, however, the Court upheld the search as an "automobile exception"
based entirely on a probable cause determination by the police.
E. The Expansion of the Automobile Exception
Today, under Capps and Ross, the "automobile exception" has been
expanded to permit police to search all containers within a motor vehicle
if there is probable cause for the search. 5' The effect of Capps and Ross
is to elevate the automobile exception almost to the level of a warrant. 152
The police may assume that the scope of their lawful search is whatever
would be permissable with a warrant. Consequently, law enforcement
officials now may decide matters of probable cause and the scope of
144. Id.
145. Id. at 825.
146. Id. at 823.
147. Id. at 825.
148. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
149. One search took place at the scene after the arrest, and another occurred later at the police
station. 456 U.S. at 801.
150. Id. The majority stated, however: "[A]n individual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle
and its contents may not survive if probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting
contraband." Id. at 823.
151. Id. at 823.
152. Id. The Ross dissent noted: "[Tihe majority assumes what has never been the law: that the
scope of the automobile-mobility exception to the warrant requirement is as broad as the scope of
a 'lawful' probable-cause search of an automobile, i.e., one authorized by a magistrate." Id. at 833
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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automobile searches without the prior magistrate approval previously
required by the courts in most cases. If, in a case like Ross, officers
expect that warrants would give them search powers, they may search
immediately, even absent the previous requirement of exigent circum-
stances.' As the Ross court held, "If probable cause justifies the search
of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the
vehicle and its contents. . . .1'54 Now, a law enforcement official's de-
termination that he has probable cause to believe that contraband is some-
where in a vehicle justifies a search of that vehicle and its containers.' 55
Many courts, including the Ross Court, have reaffirmed the language
of the landmark search and seizure case, Katz v. United States. 156 In Katz,
the Court held that the fourth amendment protects citizens' reasonable
expectations of privacy, stating: "[S]earches conducted outside the ju-
dicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few spe-
cifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' 57 Capps and Ross,
however, have greatly expanded the the once well-delineated automobile
exception. The automobile exception now extends the scope of warrant-
less automobile searches to be as broad as that allowed by a neutral
magistrate or judge via warrants.' According to some experts, the ex-
ception after Ross is not a carefully guarded "automobile exception" to
the warrant requirement; rather, it is a step toward "eliminating the war-
rant requirement and replacing it with a simple reasonableness test. . .. " 1 9
Indeed, the dissent in Ross reasoned that the majority's decision, in effect,
simply created a new "probable cause" exception to the warrant require-
ment for automobiles.16°
153. Id. at 833 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 825.
155. Id. The Court in Ross, however, did not disturb the holdings in United States v. Chadwick
and Arkansas v. Sanders. Id. at 824. Although this "container case" doctrine may still be alive, it
may be strictly limited to facts similar to Chadwick and Sanders. In those two cases, law enforcement
officials were looking only for particular containers, and they had no probable cause to believe that
the alleged contraband within the containers had been removed to other parts of the vehicle. United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766. Therefore, the Court
may still require law enforcement officials to seize containers and to obtain search warrants if (1)
the officials have probable cause to believe contraband is in a particular container in an automobile
and (2) the officials have no reason to believe the contraband is in other places, because, for example,
suspects have had no time to place containers in the car and take the contraband outside the container.
See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (police suspected contraband was inside
a footlocker; suspects placed the footlocker in a car trunk and police immediately thereafter searched
the footlocker).
156. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (warrantless government eavesdropping found violative of the fourth
amendment's privacy protections).
157. Id. at 357. This language was also quoted by the Ross Court, 456 U.S. at 825.
158. 456 U.S. at 825.
159. Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19 Am.
Cr. L. Rev. 557, 601 (1982).
160. 456 U.S. at 832 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The fourth amendment was designed to protect citizens against unrea-
sonable warrantless searches by the government by requiring a neutral
determination of probable cause. 16' Probable cause must be supported by
an oath or an affirmation and the warrant must "particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched .... "62 After Capps and Ross, however, a law
enforcement officer may determine whether he has adequate probable
cause and he may search accordingly; a neutral magistrate's determination
now is unnecessary in most automobile search cases. '63 Consequently,
the dissent asserted that the Ross decision effectively repealed "all realistic
limits on warrantless automobile searches . . . and repeal[ed] the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement itself."' 6 The dissent stated, "A rule
so broad that all citizens lose [this] vital Fourth Amendment protection
is no cause for celebration.""'6 Similarly, the Capps dissent vigorously
maintained that the courts must protect against infringement of individual
rights, or "it is the community which must ultimately suffer. "166 Searches
by police require the greatest restraint upon an officer, the Capps dissent
reasoned, and the fourth amendment's protections have been and should
be asserted by the courts to protect citizens' rights of privacy and personal
security, "the very essence of constitutional liberty." 1 67
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Capps and Ross, the automobile exception provided law en-
forcement officials with an avenue for lawful warrantless searches of cars
and some containers when the officials found probable cause, exigent
circumstances, and, in some cases, lower expectations of privacy. This
carefully delineated exception offered a compromise between the need
for effective law enforcement and the need for preservation of citizens'
legitimate privacy interests. In State v. Capps, the New Mexico Supreme
Court shifted this balance to favor law enforcement. Similarly, the United
States Supreme Court, in United States v. Ross, extended the automobile
161. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57. See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 833 (1982)
(Marshall, J. dissenting); and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967): "[Tihe principal object
of the Fourth Amendmefit is the protection of privacy .... Id. at 304.
162. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
163. Ross, 456 U.S. at 823. The Ross dissent insisted that an "on-the-spot determination of
probable cause is never the same as a decision by a neutral and detached magistrate." Id. at 833-
34 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The majority, however, defended the police
officer's determination by pointing out a safeguard: "In choosing to search without a warrant on
their own assessment of probable cause, police officers of course lose the protection that a warrant
would provide to them in an action for damages brought by an individual claiming that the search
was unconstitutional." Id. at 823 n.32. After Ross, however, most warrantless automobile searches
are no longer easily proved unconstitutional.
164. 456 U.S. at 827 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 843 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. 97 N.M. at 463, 641 P.2d at 494 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
167. Id.
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exception to facilitate warrantless searches. Both cases now exemplify
the expansion of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The effect of these two decisions is that the exigent circumstances pre-
requisite will seldom be required for a search of containers found within
an automobile. The emphasis clearly has shifted from requiring exigent
circumstances to primarily focusing on probable cause.168 Although the
courts have continued to discuss exigent circumstances, the requirement
was not as controlling in Capps and Ross as it had been in prior cases. 69
After Capps and Ross, if police have probable cause to suspect an au-
tomobile contains contraband, they may search every object within the
car which they believe may contain the contraband. 170 The fourth amend-
ment requirements for warrants and neutral magistrate determinations of
probable cause are weakened, if not set aside, with this expanded auto-
mobile exception. This new focus by the courts provides a strong "warrant
exception"for law enforcement officials and, in effect, signals a recon-
sideration by the courts of the meaning and policy of the fourth amend-
ment.
JULIE N. ALTWIES
168. This rule allowing probable cause alone to trigger a warrantless automobile and container
search may only apply to non-container cases, where a specific container is not the target. A few
Chadwick-like cases still may require a warrant prior to a government search. See supra note 155.
169. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 458, 641
P.2d 404, 489 (1982). Exigent circumstances, such as mobility of the vehicle, have been controlling
factors in many prior automobile exception cases, beginning with Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
170. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 458, 641
P.2d 404, 489.
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